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Source: *Hypatia*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Feminist Ethics and Social Policy, Part 1 (Winter, 1995), pp. 120-132

Published by: [Wiley](#) on behalf of [Hypatia, Inc.](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810461>

Accessed: 22/09/2014 07:12

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Mixed Black and White Race and Public Policy

NAOMI ZACK

The American folk concept of race assumes the factual existence of races. However, biological science does not furnish empirical support for this assumption. Public policy derived from nineteenth century slave-owning patriarchy is the only foundation of the "one-drop rule" for black and white racial inheritance. In principle, Americans who are both black and white have a right to identify themselves racially. In fact, recent demographic changes and multiracial academic scholarship support this right.

There is so much myth involved in the classification of Americans into black and white racial categories that the facts about race are part of the subject of Racial Theory. Racial Theory is the intellectual structure within which it is possible to develop an understanding of how *race* is socially constructed. In that theoretical context, the ordinary concept of race in the United States, which purports to be about something hereditary and physical, has no scientific foundation; neither does this concept have an ethical rationale that ensures just treatment for individuals or a maximization of benefits for all concerned groups. In this essay, I mean to sketch the historical, empirical, and emancipatory context for permitting American individuals of mixed black and white race to identify themselves racially. Such permission would be a matter of future public policy in many different political, intellectual, scientific, and educational contexts—it would reflect a massive paradigm shift in emancipatory black and white racial thought and action, just as the historical denial of permission has reflected white racism and racial oppression. Because the case of black and white racial mixture has always been the site of the most stringent impositions of racial purity in American culture, argument for self-identification in that case is an important beginning for unraveling racial mythology in general.

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THE ONE-DROP RULE

The racial categories of black and white race form a rigid, asymmetrical classification system in the United States. On a folk level, it is assumed that an individual is either black or white, but not both.¹ However, there have been individuals acknowledged as having both black and white ancestors since seventeenth-century colonial days, so something besides the facts of heredity as they are understood in other cases of ancestral diversity must be at work here.² At work is the one-drop rule, which has been reflected in the United States census since 1920. According to the one-drop rule, an individual is racially black if he or she has one black ancestor anywhere in her genealogical line of descent, and this holds regardless of whether, or how many, white, Asian, or Native American ancestors were also present. By contrast, a person is white only if she has no nonwhite ancestors. That is the logic behind American racial designations, and its only basis is the public policy that was associated with black chattel slavery. Nevertheless, Americans assume that there are biological foundations for racial classifications. That there are no such foundations is worth a few minutes to review.

THE BIOLOGY OF RACE

First of all, the drop in the one-drop rule refers to a drop of blood. It used to be believed that ancestors literally passed their blood on to their descendants and that this blood mixed with the blood of other ancestors whenever a child was conceived. We now know that this is nonsense: maternal and fetal blood circulate separately; blood is not passed on, but its type is copied genetically; there are no general racial blood types—human blood types are distinguished for transfusion purposes, and full siblings may have incompatible blood types.³

According to biological anthropologists, the racial unit is not an individual but a population that has more of some physical traits than other populations. There probably never have been pure races because racial populations have rarely been isolated from members of other racial populations. Social taboos may substitute for geographical isolation in breeding populations, but no such taboo has ever been completely effective; and even if such a taboo were effective, the physical traits that would be designated as racial traits would be a matter of cultural choice and not biology.⁴ Biologically, there is no *general* genetic marker for race. There are genes associated with particular physical traits that have been socially designated as racial traits, but no gene for white race, black race, Asian race, or any other race has been scientifically identified during the centuries in which the modern idea of race has been in circulation.⁵ It is important, in this regard, to note the contrast with sex. Although all individuals do not neatly divide into XX or XY on a chromosomal level because

of borderline and more complex combinations of X and Y, nevertheless, X and Y are identifiable as general sexual markers that determine more specific sexual characteristics.⁶ Even after all social constructions of sex and gender are filtered out, the overwhelming majority of individuals are XX or XY. This general XX-ness or XY-ness causes or explains less general physical characteristics, which themselves have underlying genes. For example, the presence of XX predicts the presence of the gene for ovaries. If it were the case that all of the specific physical sexual characteristics varied along continua and that XX and XY did not exist, then there would be no general genetic basis for sex. That is the situation with race. The specific physical characteristics that different cultures have designated as racial in different ways, vary, without any underlying general genetic marker that causes them or that can be used to explain their presence. Once one realizes this, it becomes clear that *race* is what cultures take it to be. As a *general* biological characteristic, which is how racist cultures construct race, race does not exist. But given racist constructions, race has a powerful social reality, and it is therefore an extraordinarily complex subject to both refer to and dissolve at the same time.

Due to the one-drop rule, an American classified as black may have more genes that cause physical characteristics considered to be white than an American classified as white. The presence of a black ancestor does not ensure the presence of any of the genes of that ancestor beyond the second generation. This is because individuals get one-half of their genes from each parent, and there is no guarantee that they have genes from all four grandparents—the “racial” genes, that is, the genes underlying perceptible traits that the culture has designated as “racial” traits, might be just as likely to drop out as the nonracial ones. Lest it seem contradictory to speak—even in quotes—of racial genes in the same breath as a claim that there are no genes for race, it should be remembered that a racial gene is a gene for a trait that has been *culturally* determined to be a racial trait. There is nothing specifically racial in a biological sense about a “racial” gene. “Racial” genes are genes that underlie skin color, hair texture, and other physical characteristics of human beings. They otherwise have nothing extra, physically or genetically, to distinguish them from other “nonracial” genetic differences, except that these “racial” genes have been designated, picked out, identified, as “racial.” Finally, it should also be noted that so-called racial genes do not get inherited in clumps. Most genes are subject to dispersal and recombination at conception, and the genes behind the physical traits that society has picked out as racial are no more likely to get passed on together than are genes for traits to which society attaches no racial significance.⁷ This is why individuals who are otherwise presumed to be of the same race do not all have the same racial traits.

Groups of individuals from the same geographical area, such as a part of precolonial Africa, may share some biological traits among their members, such as dark brown skin and curly hair. But the designation of these traits as

racial is a purely cultural construction. Ever since the colonial period racial designation has accompanied the oppression and exploitation, or domination, of the groups so designated. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the domination of what are now called third world populations was practiced by Europeans on a global scale. The physical differences from Europeans of these third world peoples and the assumed difference in geographical origins of their ancestors became the basis of modern European concepts of race. Until the 1920s, social scientists also assumed that cultural differences among racially designated groups were physically inherited.⁸

THE AMERICAN HISTORY OF THE ONE-DROP RULE

In colonial America, prisoners from Africa were worked as slaves, along with Europeans and Native Americans. By the end of the eighteenth century, these African slaves were known as “n”egroes—the ‘n’ was always lowercase until the Harlem Renaissance—and only “n”egroes could be enslaved in the United States.⁹ By that time, those individuals who were then called “negroes” and who historians after the 1930s refer to as “Negroes,” but who should probably be referred to as American slaves, had been conceptualized as a distinct race from whites, lower in biological hierarchy and intellectually and morally inferior to whites (Zack 1993, 116-122). So, first African prisoners were made slaves and then they were defined as a “race” of “negroes.” Every member of this “race” of “negroes” was posited as having the characteristics of a population that was essentially different from the “white” population. (Unfortunately, the limitations of this essay preclude investigation of the development of cultural constructions of racial whiteness, not to mention the racialization of the indigenous American population.) Why was it necessary to posit that difference as a matter of public policy? Because the white population, as a matter of public policy, based on Enlightenment political theory, was constructed as having a human birthright of freedom (Immerwahr and Burke 1993, 26-7). The next conceptual step in the American racializing program, insofar as it was connected with the institution of slavery, entailed an identification of enslavement itself as a determinant of race.

The common assumption among contemporary historians is that in English North America, “Negroes” were enslaved because they were “n”egroes.¹⁰ In fact, the situation was worse than that: African prisoners and their descendants were enslaved and kept in slavery for the simple reason that they or their ancestors were first enslaved. This was accomplished through the mediating concept of race, specifically the concept of “negro race.”

The final North American public policy regarding the children of female slaves was beneficial to the economic interests of the owners of female slaves. As owners of living things, these owners wanted to have secure ownership of the offspring of what they already owned. Since only “n”egroes could be owned

as slaves, the only way that they could own the children of their slaves were if those children were “n”egroes. As everyone has always known, the fathers of many children of women slaves were not slaves or “n”egroes. Therefore, to protect the economic interests of slave owners in English North America, the institution of slavery gave birth to the one-drop rule, as a matter of public policy. By contrast, in Louisiana under French rule and throughout Latin America, manumission of children with slave mothers and free white fathers was common all through the period of slavery. Those children were recognized as mixed black and white race.¹¹

It became illegal to import slaves into the United States, in the 1830s. Then the cotton gin increased the speed with which cotton could be processed, and the need for slave labor to grow cotton increased. The large-scale miscegenation of the slave population due to generations of sexual exploitation of female slaves by free whites, as well as intraracial miscegenation within the “n”egro population, resulted in an otherwise embarrassing number of “whiter” slave offspring, who, if they were not automatically designated “n”egroes, because only negroes could be enslaved, would have presented a disastrous loss of capital for the slave economy. After Louisiana came under the rule of Anglo-Americans, and throughout slavery in the United States after the 1850s, all the children of slave mothers, regardless of their paternity, were assumed to have the racial status of their mothers. This was of course contrary to English custom and law, which supported patriarchal descent in all other matters of lineage and property (Zack 1993, 57-61).

Even though, originally, the economics of slavery determined the public policy of the one-drop rule, the abolition of slavery did not mitigate the application of this rule. Between the Civil War and 1915 the one-drop rule became the law in most states, where it was expressed in so-called anti-miscegenation laws that proscribed interracial marriage (Zack 1993, 79-82).¹² Ironically, this policy was locked in place among African Americans during the Harlem Renaissance, when many prominent mixed-race black spokespersons explicitly took up Negro identities to the conceptual obliteration of their white ancestors. At the time, there was no choice in the matter because the United States census no longer recognized a category of mixed race; so anyone who was “black” according to the one-drop rule was not accepted as white in American society (Zack 1993, 95-112). Even though the antimiscegenation laws were struck down by the United States Supreme Court in 1967, the one-drop rule has never been successfully challenged as a basis for racial classification. Officially, and according to custom, an American is black given one black ancestor, no matter how many white ancestors she has and regardless of her social experiences.

MIXED BLACK AND WHITE RACE AND PRESENT PUBLIC POLICY: IN PRINCIPLE

The American history of racial categorization was unjust. Against the widespread understanding that the United States has a long history of racial injustice, this might occasion a yawn. However, we are still trapped in the rigidity of notions of biological racial difference that presuppose pseudoscientific ideas of race. And the one-drop rule is still public policy. Whites assume that this is how blacks want it, and blacks continue to reproduce it socially for a variety of reasons, including the preservation of hard-won affirmative action benefits that reinforce "pure" racial identities, family and community loyalty, and the continuing devaluation and oppression of individuals with African ancestry by individuals without African ancestry.

Nonetheless, many individuals of mixed black and white race, especially of first generation "mixture," experience the one-drop rule not only as racist in itself, against them, but as fundamentally supportive of the false categories of race. The whole idea of race requires an assumption of a population stable in certain physical characteristics, which will "breed true." That is, the idea of race rests on fantasies of racial purity.

The question is not whether it is better for an individual with black and white ancestors to be designated white, or partly black and partly white, than all black, because addressing the question in those terms accepts a foundation of the unjust treatment of blacks by whites. Rather, these are the pertinent questions: Since there is no such thing as race and our present legacy of racial categories is shot through with pseudoscience and racist habits and beliefs, how should "race" be determined? Who should decide what race I am to myself? How should anyone determine the "race" of another person? Notice that there are two levels to these questions. If race is a fiction, then the person of pure race is in the same position regarding these questions as the person of mixed race. But, if race is accepted or recognized as a social reality, then, in the context of the nonsense of the one-drop rule, the person of mixed black and white race presents a special problem to herself and others.

I would like to stay on the level that all notions of race are fictions, but I don't think that is yet feasible at this time in American culture. Therefore, I am provisionally going to go along with the fiction that there are such things as black and white race, as a basis on which to consider the ongoing one-drop rule from the standpoint of an individual of mixed black and white race. How should mixed black and white individuals identify themselves and be racially identified by others at this time?

I think that the only emancipatory answer to that question has to be provided by the individuals themselves. It has been estimated that between 75 percent and 90 percent of all African Americans have some white ancestry. Within this group, the group likely to self-identify as mixed race is probably no more than 10 percent or 15 percent (Williamson 1980, 9-16, 125). If,

however, there is no scientific foundation to the concept of race, that is, if races do not exist, then neither do mixed races exist. The facts of racial mixture, namely the existence of individuals of mixed race, undermine the very notion of race, which presupposes racial “purity.” Since there never have been pure races, it is impossible to calculate degrees of racial mixture. Still, despite these puzzles, on a folk level, Americans take race very seriously, and it is only fair that those individuals who do not fit into any one of the recognized racial categories have an opportunity to identify themselves, that is, to choose their own racial identities.

As it stands now, most people “choose” a racial identity after they have learned how others identify them. This is a passive process of choice, closer to socially approved assent than free choice. Children with a black parent and a white parent, and even greater degrees of racial diversity, are now obligated to “choose” which box to check as they move through the various institutional processes of racial identification in the culture. They choose the box that “best” applies to them, but nothing in official or social reality permits them a choice of *everything* that applies to them in racial terms.

Broadly speaking, even given the racial fictions in place, every person defines for herself what it means to be what she is racially by learning about her family history. Using present energy and making commitments for the future, she invents her racial identity at the same time that she tells herself she is discovering it. This is an existential point. The person of mixed race is as entitled to this existential process, with its self-defining illusion of invention masquerading as discovery, as is the person of presumptively pure race. In the present case, she has a right to be mixed race rather than black race or white race. At present, she can be white only if she lies about the presence of a black ancestor. And she can only eschew all racial identity, should she choose to invent herself on the ground of her discovery that race is a fiction, if she refuses to participate in many cultural contexts that might otherwise benefit her. This right for a mixed race person to be mixed race seems to be a fundamental requirement for psychological and social health, but it is as difficult to create a general justification for it as it is to justify the right of human beings to selfhood. In fact, the generality of the justification can only be anchored by something beyond American law and culture, as I will try to do in a moment. United States federal racial classification systems presently allow for only four racial categories—black, white, Asian and Native American, with an added ethnic rider of Hispanic or non-Hispanic. Where categories of “other” have been added to state forms, according to “Directive 15,” the components of “other” in individual cases are reassessed, and if an individual has a black ancestor, the individual is reclassified as black (see Fernández 1995; Graham 1995).

In June 1993 the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel heard public testimony concerning

the inclusion of a multiracial category in the U.S. census. As of this writing, the outcome of those hearings is inconclusive. It is not merely that even liberal public record keeping is constrained by outmoded concepts of race in the population at large. The inconclusiveness is further diffused by the expressed concern of African American interest groups that if part of their presently designated constituency of African Americans redesignates itself as multiracial, the remaining constituency will lose affirmative action gains (see Wright 1994). Nonetheless, many black and white mixed-race Americans continue to wonder whether one-drop black racial identification, based on biological fiction, should be supported at the expense of more accurate description and record keeping. It is difficult to see how anyone except the mixed-race individuals themselves would have a right to decide that matter.

According to international moral-political rights theories, as stated in the United Nations Charter, the right of Americans of mixed race to identify themselves and be identified, that is, recognized, as a distinct racial category would seem to be related to other social and political rights of self-determination. The analogue to national self-determination in this political sense, for mixed black and white Americans, is racial self-identification. As with emerging nations, united within themselves by geography, self-identification precedes identification and recognition by others.

Mixed-race people do not constitute geographically continuous, potentially sovereign entities as groups, so there is no issue of political independence at stake. But, neither do racially pure groups present a basis for national sovereignty—except within separatist movements, which in the United States, at least, have been motivated by extremist and supremacist ideologies. There has been, of course, some geographically based political districting of black racial interests in the United States in recent years for the presumed benefit of blacks. If some of the people in those districts revise their identification as racially mixed and not-black, there is concern that the remaining blacks would not benefit as much as when the group was larger (Wright 1994). But, the resulting groups could form coalitions. And, the racism against blacks that presupposes nonexistent general differences among all members of racially designated populations will have been undermined to the extent that everyone publicly acknowledges that some American blacks have white ancestors and are therefore not, strictly speaking, “black.” If all blacks are not black because some of them are also white, then the rigid differences that people mistakenly assume have a biological foundation would begin to soften in American folk thought. This would in turn undermine racism as a psychological attitude based on an assumption of strong physical difference.

Furthermore, the United Nations Charter expresses an international moral-political consensus that all individuals are entitled to the same rights, regardless of race and color (Article 2). If blacks and whites have a right to identify themselves as such, then so do mixed black and white individuals. The United

Nations Charter also stipulates that no one may be compelled to belong to an association (Article 20, #2). If the one-drop rule does not have the biological foundation it has been assumed to have in American history, then no one should be compelled to be black. And, if race itself is a fiction, then no one should be compelled to identify herself or be identified by others in any way at all racially, if she so chooses. Failure to identify in some specific way racially, or in any way racially, ought not to put anyone at a disadvantage compared to those who do so identify.

In the context of freedom of association as stipulated by the United Nations Charter, racial identification has not yet been addressed because it has been assumed up to now that racial identification has a neutral, factual foundation. Indeed, the international theoretical work on race has primarily focused on the promulgation of the findings of the social and biological sciences of the first half of the twentieth century, which concluded that cultural differences among racial groups are matters of historical contingency rather than physical heredity.¹³ But, since there is no empirical, factual foundation for the American one-drop rule of black racial classification, in many cases of mixed race, there are no neutral, factual determinants for racial identification. Given this absence of an assumed biological foundation for racial identification, if it is, for whatever reason, necessary that mixed-race individuals be identified by race, those individuals have a right to choose their racial identifications, based on the United Nations Charter right to freedom of association.

In situations where an individual's chosen racial designation is at odds with how others classify her, care should be taken by those others to refine the empirical basis on which they make their identifications. And in many cases, the reliance on socially coerced self-identification, that is, the one-drop rule, is so strong that experts will have to dispense with racial categories altogether. An interesting example of this is found in recent American Medical Association policy recommendations for the detection of sickle-cell anemia in infants. It was formally believed that infants of nonwhite racial groups were at higher risk for this disease; however, medical practitioners have come to realize that they have no reliable criteria for identifying all infants racially, so the recommended procedure for detection is to test all infants for sickle-cell anemia, regardless of the racial group to which they seem to belong or are said to belong (Clinton 1991, 2158).

Mixed-race individuals would also have a right to reject all racial identification, just as a full right to freedom in religious affiliation would include the choice of no religious affiliation, or the choice of atheism. I have so far been suggesting that black and white mixed-race Americans would choose to identify as mixed race or nonracial. But even that is too stringent a projection once the false categories begin to crumble. Some people who are mixed black and white race will choose to be black. Others will choose to be white. And still others will choose to identify based on Asian or Native American ancestry.

MIXED BLACK AND WHITE RACE AND PRESENT PUBLIC POLICY: IN FACT

Parallel to the foregoing theoretical justification for self-identification for individuals of mixed race, there is a demographic and grass-roots basis for such self-identification that public policy theorists and planners need to allow into their awareness as specific contexts make relevant. Statistically, mixed-race births in the United States have increased 26 times as much as pure-race births over recent decades.¹⁴ And now, for the first time in American history, due to the success of the Civil Rights movement, albeit incomplete and begrudged, there is a generation of mixed black and white individuals who are not ashamed of their racial origins, and whose parents do not experience a need to apologize for having brought them into the world.

Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally), an organization originating from efforts to change racial designations of school children in Georgia, has been lobbying legislatures in recent years to include multiracial categories on the U.S. census and in local record keeping. The membership of the Association of MultiEthnic Americans consists of mixed-race families and their children; they actively support one another through social and cultural events and newsletters in which they share their experiences in the larger society that does not recognize their existence as mixed race.¹⁵

When people from different racial categories have children, as they always have done despite the existence of social or legal strictures, and whether they do so as a result of exploitation, accident, ignorance, or love, fairness in a racial society requires that those children receive the same degree of racial respect as presumptively racially pure children, especially since it is widely assumed that racial identities are constructed in childhood in ways closely connected with self-esteem on deep motivational levels. It is not known to what extent the importance of a child's positive feelings about race is a result of racism in the culture. Neither is it known whether it would be consistent with other aspects of mental health and social adjustment for individuals to eschew all racial identity—even in a racist society. Before the studies can be conducted that will provide empirical answers to these questions, however, the conceptual framework or theoretical assumptions that would otherwise underlie such studies must be reexamined. There is no reason to believe that social scientists are not as burdened by racial mythology as other people.

At this time, for the first time in American academic letters, a small, rapidly increasing number of scholars from varied disciplines are beginning to discuss these issues of microdiversity, and the subject of mixed race is becoming a recognized addition to curricula that address diversity and multiculturalism: Paul Spickard (1989), F. James Davis (1991), Maria P.P. Root (1992), and I (1993, 1995) have recently published book-length works on the topic of mixed race in the United States; and further work is in press as of this writing. (The popular print media and commercial publishing houses are not far behind, or

ahead, as the case may be.) The general scholarly topic is *Racial Theory*, the specialization at issue is *Mixed Race* (or *Multirace*), but in practical policy-making contexts, the facts that need to be addressed are the facts of *microdiversity*. The term “microdiversity” points to the reality that many individuals are racially diverse within themselves and not merely diverse as members of groups that are believed, in often erroneous ways, to be racially different from other groups.

The map of the emancipatory scholarship of microdiversity is now on the drawing board: it may be filled in by tracing out the complex varieties of microdiversity which exist in reality; or it may blaze a route to a neo-universalist rejection of the concept of race in both scholarly and popular culture. In historical analyses, microdiversity intersects with critiques of patriarchy because the one-drop rule is a legacy of white male slave owners; and in feminist analyses of contemporary culture, microdiversity intersects with gender because mixed-race women are still stereotyped as exotic, erotic, and morally defective.

In terms of present practice and policy, microdiversity has indeterminate connections with affirmative action. Since the aim of both affirmative action and the scholarship of microdiversity is to improve the institutional situations of individuals who would otherwise be overlooked or abused, both become redundant if they succeed. In the meantime, if affirmative action is just and effective, the facts of microdiversity strengthen its mandate because people of mixed race have never before been positively acknowledged to exist. So long as Americans believe in races, they will believe in racial whiteness, and whites will probably continue to be generally better off than nonwhites. And if affirmative action programs continue to be the chosen strategy for achieving equality, then mixed-race individuals, insofar as they do not belong to the white, privileged, dominant group, would continue to qualify as affirmative action clients (or “patients”).

I want to close with a word of caution. Tigers have to be dismantled with great care. It's one thing to understand within a safe forum that race is a biological fiction. In American culture at large, the fiction of race continues to operate as fact, and in situations of backlash against emancipatory progress, the victims of racial oppression, nonwhites, are insulted and injured further for their progress against oppression. If those who practice such second-order oppression begin to employ the truth that race is a fiction, gains already secured against first-order oppression (or in redress of it) could be jeopardized. This is a risk many will find daunting, but the answer is not to back off from the truth but to realize that it will take a while to replace the fictitious cultural realities. If the truth about mixed black and white race and race in general were to be (affirmatively) taught throughout the American educational system, it would take about two generations to have a real effect on the culture—the first generation would learn it in school and teach it to their children.

NOTES

1. For more comprehensive discussions of the inadequacy of the American folk concepts of black and white race, see Zack (1993, 1994).
2. For a book-length treatment of the history of mixed black and white race in the United States, conducted within the traditional racial paradigm, see Williamson (1980).
3. For the facts on blood and race, see Zack (1993, chap. 2 and references).
4. For a discussion of race and breeding, see Zack (1993, chap. 4).
5. For an argument about the *modernity* of contemporary concepts of race, see Bernal (1987, 439-45, 454-5). See also Zack (1996, chap. 12).
6. For a discussion of the development of X and Y as chromosomal markers of sex, see Kevles (1985, 238-50).
7. For discussions of variations in racial genes, see Dubinin (1965, 68-83) and Dunn (1965, 61-67).
8. For accounts and discussions of the history of the concept of race in the social sciences see Leiris (1965) and Wacker (1983).
9. For descriptions of nineteenth century-racial hierarchies and source references, see Zack (1993, 58-61, 78-79).
10. For example, Immerwahr and Burke write, "Only blacks were slaves and slaves were slaves *because* they were black" (1993, 27).
11. The classic comparison of North and South America on this issue is Degler (1971).
12. For further details on the history of antimiscegenation laws, see Sickels (1972).
13. For the United Nations positions on race, culture, and heredity, see "Four Statements on the Race Question" (drafted at Unesco House, Paris) in Kuper (1965, 344-364).
14. For the statistics on the increase of mixed-race marriages and births, see Special Reports (1993, 20-21).
15. See Project Race Newsletter, April 1993 (Roswell, Georgia).

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